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The proposal by Chen and Wasserman (2017) contributes to a long-standing debate about
the scope of prenatal screening services. With realistic prospects of fetal genome-scale
sequencing from noninvasive maternal blood sampling (NIPW), their framework is timely.
However, we outline a number of concerns regarding this approach, ranging from the
philosophical to the social and clinical.
A key concern in this literature is that the framework lacks a clear philosophical foundation.
Despite the long history of prenatal diagnosis (PND), a central question remains regarding
the core justification for these services.
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_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Prenatal screening, testing, and pregnancy termination represent a complex, value-laden,
and expensive enterprise, preferably delivered by professionals. If society believes that
these services should be routinely offered to pregnant couples, as recommended by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (Rose and Mercer 2016), then
justification is necessary. Any proposal to dramatically increase the scope of these services
requires further explanation for why an expansion is consistent with the core justification.
There are three traditional justifications for PND (Bot- kin 1995). A child-centered
justification argues that prenatal screening is intended to serve the interests of the future
children. While the prenatal detection of certain conditions can benefit the child and family
through advance planning, this is not the primary justification. The objective of prenatal
genetic testing is to detect health problems that could affect the woman, fetus, or newborn
and provide the patient and her care providers with enough information to allow an
informed decision about pregnancy management, including termination. So the question is
whether termination of a fetus can be construed as a benefit to the future child. Wrongful
life lawsuits implicitly or explicitly sup- port this notion. But for the most part, wrongful life
suits have not been successful in the courts, and this line of argument in the literature has
dwindled because the premise makes little sense. There are few, if any, conditions for which
we might make a cogent argument that termination is preferable to life with that condition.

A social justification suggests that prenatal diagnosis benefits society by reducing the
number of children born with expensive health conditions. There is a history of studies that
claim to show the economic value of PND, but these studies are often of poor quality due to
questionable assumptions and the value-laden nature of the analyses. Further, the notion
that society should support PND for the purported social benefits obtained through the
prevention of undesirable members is plainly eugenic. A justification of PND solely for such
social benefit is no longer accepted.
The justification for PND as a service that promotes the interests of prospective parents
remains viable. Here the argument is that prospective parents benefit from these services
by being able to make informed choices about the birth of a child with a condition that may
have important impacts on their family or by providing time to plan for the birth of an
affected child. This line of argument is strongest when the conditions targeted have
significant implications for parents and the family, such as conditions that are lethal for the
child or severely debilitating. This rationale has much less force when talking about
screening for milder conditions or non-health-related conditions. If Chen and Wasserman
support this general line of argument, they need a more explicit justification for why
parents have a positive right to genome-scale information on the fetus and why enormous
new resources should be invested in this enterprise. Our second broad concern relates to
their assumptions regarding the association between genotype and phenotype.
Their arguments presuppose that the identification of a DNA variant in a fetus will be
directly related to a health outcome. Unlike molecular testing in the pediatric population, in
which an individual with clinical fi dings has molecular analysis as an attempt to identify or
confirm a diagnosis, prenatal testing strategies with NIPW are much more complex. Routine
prenatal screening is performed in the context of evaluating a normal-appearing fetus; a
fetus with obvious birth defects is currently referred for diagnostic testing with chorionic
villus sampling (CVS) or amniocentesis (Rose et al. 2016). It is known that healthy
individuals can harbor many deleterious genes without clinical findings (Cooper et al.
2013). Therefore, the clinical validity of genome-scale screening results in unselected
populations is likely to be very poor. Further, there are no population-based studies that
will capture data on phenotype– genotype correlations in the context of fetal genome
sequencing. In the future, collecting such data would be resource intensive and only likely to
be justified for conditions considered serious for the child and family.
Our third concern goes directly to the core assumption about the negative impact that “line
drawing” in PND has for people with the conditions that are explicitly targeted. A central
rationale for the proposed framework is that a full disclosure model avoids the
identification of specific conditions in public policy for which PND and pregnancy
termination are considered justified. But there is a set of assumptions here that have not
been validated. Does the offer of PND for Condition A lead to increased stigma or
discrimination against those with Condition A? This question can only be answered by
analyzing broad social trends, which are influenced by multiple factors beyond any
experimental control. With this large caveat, our observation is that social stigma and
discrimination have substantially decreased in recent decades for individuals with
conditions like Down syndrome (DS), spina bifida, sickle cell disease, cystic fibrosis, and the
like that have been the primary focus for PND.
There are several trends in contemporary medicine that illustrate and perhaps influence

relevant social attitudes. First, there has been a remarkable investment in treatments for
all of the conditions traditionally targeted by PND. The life span for people with cystic
fibrosis has progressively improved and there are established and exciting new possibilities
for cure for many people with sickle cell disease (Tasan, Jain, and Zhao 2016). Children with
Down syndrome and their families now have a broad range of interventions and supportive
services that can address associated medical conditions, developmental challenges, and
speech and language issues. Clearly these types of improvements in health care would not
have occurred if society and families with affected children did not highly value affected
individuals. This is not to claim that discrimination against those with disabilities is not an
ongoing problem, only that the medical landscape is dominated by energetic treatment and
support efforts despite advances in PND.
A second observation is that the prevalences of many conditions traditionally targeted by
PND have not decreased dramatically as a result. In the United States, the prevalence at
birth of Down syndrome has increased in recent years (Mai et al. 2013). This increase is
likely due to competing influences of a trend toward older age at birth for mothers versus
the role of PND in decreasing birth prevalence, although neither of these trends is dramatic.
de Graaf and colleagues (de Graaf, Buck- ley, and Skotko 2015) estimate that the proportion
of DS fetuses terminated is about 30% and this fi has remained stable over the past 20
years. Rising prevalence and stable termination rates occur in the face of changes in PND
approaches that involve offers of screening to progressively larger proportions of the
pregnant population and progressively less invasive screening tools. These data points
suggest that developments in PND have not led to expanding demand for these services. To
our knowledge, there is no lay advocacy movement calling for more and better prenatal
diagnosis. The use of PND remains in the realm of personal choice and, for a variety of
reasons, the majority of pregnant couples are not effectively using existing PND
technologies to prevent the birth of children with DS. We think it unlikely that NIPW will
lead to a significant new demand for actionable information on traits with considerably less
impact on families.
Finally, public policy in recent decades in the United States has been enacted to attempt to
counter stigma and dis- crimination against those with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the ADA Amendments Act, and the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act all reflect commitments at the federal level to inclusion of
people with disabilities. Many other federal and state laws also address disability
discrimination. Nonetheless, problems of inclusion clearly remain. To offer just two
examples, people with disabilities continue to be significantly under or unemployed, and
Medicaid coverage for home- and community-based services remains inadequate in many
states. Given such circumstances, it is unclear whether Chen and Wasserman’s proposal
promises any impact on discrimination where it plainly exists. A preferable alternative in
our judgment is to continue to press for the social conditions that can support parents in
making informed choices in accord with their values in a limited set of conditions for which
there is clear justification. Chen and Wasserman have not yet made a convincing argument
that “line drawing” in the context of PND has led or will lead to stigma or discrimination for
those with targeted conditions, or that sweeping a wider net with NIPW will impact the
remaining problems of stigma and dis- crimination experienced by those with disabilities.
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